Introduction
It is well-known in the literature on decision under uncertainty and risk that people view certain and impossible events markedly different from likely or possible events, respectively. In particular, very small deviations from certain or from impossible events have significantly more impact on choice behaviour than similar deviations from other likely events. People are optimistic about unlikely good news events but pessimistic about unlikely bad news events. They are prepared to pay comparatively large amounts for lottery tickets where there is a small chance of winning a large price, and at the same time they are willing to buy insurance against large losses that are unlikely to occur. To derive a model that can account for such behaviour with a relatively simple preference foundation has been a central topic since at least the work of Friedman and Savage (1963) . Classical expected utility is not able to accommodate optimism and pessimism about small probability events because it must capture all exhibited sensitivity in the utility function. The empirical literature on sensitivity towards probabilities is overwhelming (e.g. Allais, 1953; Ellsberg, 1961; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; MacCrimmon and Larsson, 1979; Cohen and Jaffry, 1988; Camerer, 1989; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Wu and Gonzalez, 1996; Abdellaoui, 2000; Abdellaoui et al., 2005) , and a key role for optimism and pessimism has clearly been identified (see Wakker (2001) for a discussion and a thorough review of the descriptive evidence). For the rank-dependent theories of Quiggin (1981 Quiggin ( , 1982 , Schmeidler (1989) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992) , Wakker (2001) has provided a complete and general account of optimism and of pessimism. In those models the role of utility is to account for sensitivity to changes in outcomes and a second instrument, a weighting function (or capacity for choice under uncertainty), is measuring the sensitivity towards probabilities (or towards the uncertainty about events). Optimism comes down to a concave weighting function and pessimism is described by a convex weighting function. Wakker (2001 Wakker ( , p. 1048 Wakker ( -1049 particularly highlights the descriptively most plausible pattern for weighting functions, namely the inverse-S shaped ones that are concave for unlikely good news events and convex for unlikely bad news events. A characterization of this important class of probability weighting functions is also provided there.
One difficulty with rank-dependent utility is, unlike with expected utility, that the weighting function complicates the derivation of results in applied work because of the additional mathematics that is required to deal with the weighting functions. For example, risk premia and certainty equivalents have a more complex expression. Also, when eliciting utility and its curvature, more advanced tools are required (see Wakker and Deneffe, 1996; Abdellaoui, 2000; Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2000) . A technical problem with general rank-dependent utility is also that decision weighting may cause unwarranted kinks when the rank of outcomes changes (see Wakker, 1994) . Expected utility, which is the special case of rank-dependent utility with linear probability weighting, proves to be immune to such kinks and, thus, gains some elegance because of its mathematical simplicity. It appears thus that, when choosing the appropriate model for applications, one must trade off mathematical elegance and simplicity for descriptive realism.
This paper suggests a different approach, namely a compromise as advocated by Bell (1985) , Cohen (1992) and recently Chateauneuf et al. (2007) . Instead of adopting general probability weighting functions one can adopt a specific variation that serves both to model the combination of optimism and pessimism with a single weighting function and to maintain mathematical tractability. The specific probability weighting function is linear for nonextreme probabilities, but may be discontinuous at 0 and at 1. As a result, in our model, much of the normative content of expected utility is preserved although substantial descriptive power is incorporated. Wakker (1994) has also highlighted the empirical interest in discontinuities of weighting functions at 0 and at 1 plus continuity on (0, 1). The original prospect theory model of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) explicitly used such weighting functions. More recently, Gonzalez and Wu (1999) tested the linear and discontinuous weighting function, and Kilka and Weber (2001) and Abdellaoui et al. (2005) provided estimates for the two parameters required to fully describe optimism and pessimism in our model. Parameter estimates for prospect theory specifications were also provided in Abdellaoui et al. (2010) . They also highlight the role of this class of weighting functions in linking the economic concepts of optimism and pessimism with the interpretation of curvature and elevation originating from psychology.
The existing preference foundations for the type of behaviour coined as the non-extreme outcome expected utility, or NEO-EU model by Chateauneuf et al. (2007) , have invoked a rich structure on the set of outcomes. We show that those models are also valid for the case that the set of outcomes is more general, as is often the case in real applications, e.g., for health states. We adopt the approach of Abdellaoui (2002) , which was also followed by Diecidue et al. (2009) and Zank (2010) , and exploit the structural richness offered by the probability interval. Different to these approaches we will also use a weaker continuity condition and this can complicate our derivation. As will be pointed out in Section 4, and to avoid certain unwarranted cases, some minimal structural assumption on the preference relation is required in order to achieve the familiar uniqueness results for utility and for the weighting function. Thus, we obtain cardinal utility (that is, utility is unique up positive affine transformations) and unique parameters for the weighting function.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents general notation. In Section 3 we review expected utility, and provide a specific preference foundation for this classical theory which will help to extend it to NEO-EU preferences. Section 4 highlights the difficulties that can occur when relaxing continuity and the independence axiom underlying expected utility, and presents the structural assumption that we require to derive our main results. Following that, in Section 5 we propose a new preference foundation for NEO-EU. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are deferred to the Appendix.
Preliminaries
Let X be a set of outcomes. For simplicity of exposition, we assume that X is finite, such that X = {x 0 , . . . , x n } for a natural number n.
1 A lottery is a finite probability distribution over the set X . It is represented by P = (p 0 , x 0 ; . . . ; p n , x n ) meaning that probability p j is assigned to outcome x j 2 X , for j = 0, . . . , n. Let L denote the set of all lotteries. The numbers p 0 , . . . , p n are 1 None of our results depend on this assumption. The case that X contains only one outcome is trivial. Extensions to the case of infinite X are obtained following a similar approach as in Abdellaoui (2002) .
nonnegative and sum to 1. We denote by supp(P) = {x j 2 X :
The set of lotteries L is a mixture space endowed with the operation of probability mixing, i.e., for P, Q 2 L and ↵ 2 [0, 1] the mixture ↵P + (1 ↵)Q is also a lottery in L. A preference relation, <, is assumed over L, and its restriction to subsets of L (e.g., all degenerate lotteries) is also denoted by <. The symbol denotes strict preference, ⇠ denotes indifference, and 4 respectively are the corresponding reversed preferences. We assume that no two outcomes in X are indifferent, and further, that outcomes are ordered from worst to best, i.e., x 0 · · · x n .
2 The strict ranking of outcomes in X is not a restriction for our theory. This assumption will further simplify the subsequent presentation. It can be shown that, if outcomes in X are allowed to be indifferent, our results also hold using similar arguments as in Abdellaoui (2002) and in Zank (2010) . The aim is to provide preference conditions for < in order to represent the preference relation over L by a function V . That is, V is a mapping from L into the set of real numbers, R, such that for all P, Q 2 L,
This necessarily implies that < must be a weak order, i.e., < is complete (P < Q or P 4 Q for all P, Q 2 L) and transitive (P < Q and
Expected Utility (EU) holds if the following function represents < on L:
where u, the utility function, assigns to each outcome a real value. Under EU the utility is cardinal, that is, it is unique up to positive affine transformations.
Let m P denote the worst outcome in P that has positive probability, i.e., m P = x i 2 X where i := min{j: p j > 0, j = 0, . . . , n}. Similarly, let M P denote the best outcome in P that has positive probability, i.e., M P = x i 2 X where i := max{j:
holds if the preference on L is represented by
where 0  , 0  and + < 1 are uniquely determined constants and utility is like under EU. 4 Clearly, if = = 0, then NEO-EU coincides with EU.
Otherwise, NEO-EU can accommodate more general preferences. Note that NEO-EU ''discounts'' the expected utility of a lottery by (1 ) and places the residual weight, separated into proportions and , on the utility of the worst, respectively, on the utility of the best outcome that can obtain in that lottery. A natural interpretation of NEO-EU, therefore, is that this model is ''expected utility with the best and worst in mind'' (see Chateauneuf et al., 2007) . An alternative interpretation of the NEO-EU model, one that originates from the analysis of probabilistic attitudes, is also plausible. To illustrate this we recall that probabilistic attitudes are not necessarily globally consistent in the same sense as risk attitudes captured by concave utility under EU. Optimism, for 2 We identify the degenerate lotteries (1, x j ) with the outcome x j for any j = 0, . . . , n.
3 Essentially, then, the proofs apply to a representative from each indifference set.
4 Note that NEO-EU agrees with the special case of rank-dependent utility
example, is associated with attitudes towards marginal changes in the small probabilities of best outcomes: more attention is given to the small likelihood of obtaining the best outcome in a lottery as compared to the objective probability of that outcome. Pessimism also refers to increased attention above the objective probability of an outcome, however, it refers to the worst outcomes in lotteries (see Wakker (1994 Wakker ( , 2001 , for comprehensive analyses of probabilistic risk attitudes). The overwhelming empirical evidence suggests that people are ambivalent, that is, they typically exhibit both optimism and pessimism.
We now look at optimism and pessimism as modelled in NEO-EU. We observed before that in the NEO-EU model (1 ) measures the total deviation from expected utility. Some of this deviation results from pessimistic attitudes and some from optimistic attitudes. As a result, a statement that some agent A is more affected by these probabilistic risk attitudes than some agent and, as a consequence, the preference between the two lotteries is governed entirely by their expected utility. For example, if P < Q , substitution of NEO-EU gives
which, after elimination of common terms is equivalent to EU(P) EU(Q ). Hence, NEO-EU and EU cannot be distinguished on subsets of lotteries that have the same support (or lotteries with common best and common worst outcomes). For such lotteries, a comparison of risk attitudes of agent A and agent B is solely based on the risk attitudes captured by their respective utilities.
To extract information about optimistic behaviour we need to compare behaviour for a different pair of lotteries. We do this next. Consider now the case that the two lotteries P and Q have common worst outcomes but different best outcomes. Then, the weights and will be influencing preferences beyond EU. For example, if P < Q , then substitution of NEO-EU and cancellation of common terms gives
The weight ✓ := /(1 ) can be interpreted as a measure of optimism about obtaining the best outcome in the respective lottery relative to the total deviation from expected utility. This measure is consistent in the sense that it is independent of the utility of the best outcome, thus independent of the magnitude of outcomes, but also independent of the positive probability of obtaining the best outcomes. That ✓ is independent of the outcomes is natural; this is typical in models where utility is separable from probability attitude. But ✓ being independent of the probability of obtaining the best outcome is less intuitive. Inverse-S shaped probability weighting functions are more sensitive to changes in the probabilities of extreme outcomes (see Wakker, 2001 Wakker, , 1994 . Although the linear probability weighting functions discussed here are unable to deal with changes in the probabilities of extreme outcomes, studies fitting the parametric probability weighting functions of Goldstein and Einhorn (1987) , Tversky and Kahneman (1992) , Prelec (1998) , and Diecidue et al. (2009) , indicate that the linear probability weighting function has similar explanatory power as the more flexible parametric inverse-S functions (see, e.g., Abdellaoui, 2000; Abdellaoui et al., 2005 Abdellaoui et al., , 2010 Using similar arguments one can show that the measure of pessimism about obtaining the worst outcome (relative to the total deviation from EU), := /(1 ), is critical when comparing lotteries with different worst outcomes but common best outcomes. This measure of pessimism is also consistent, similar to the measure of optimism. Hence, an alternative interpretation of NEO-EU as ''expected utility with consistent optimism about best outcomes and consistent pessimism about worst outcomes'' seems appropriate. As we show in Section 5 below, this consistency requirement is critical for NEO-EU. Before concluding this section, we recall the two conditions that are satisfied by EU but which may be violated by NEO-EU. The preference relation < satisfies vNM-independence (short for von Neumann-Morgenstern independence) if for all P, Q , R 2 L and all ↵ 2 (0, 1) it holds that
That is, the preference between P and Q remains unaffected if both, P and Q , are mixed with a common R. Note that in the definition of vNM-independence no restrictions apply to the choice of R.
The preference relation < satisfies J-continuity (short for Jensencontinuity) on the set of lotteries L if for all lotteries P Q and R there exist ⇢, µ 2 (0, 1) such that
It is well-known (e.g., Herstein and Milnor (1953), Fishburn (1970) ) that a preference relation < satisfies weak ordering, Jensencontinuity and vNM-independence on L if and only if it can be represented by expected utility. As pointed out earlier, if only lotteries with the same support are considered, then EU and NEO-EU are indistinguishable and, therefore, NEO-EU must also satisfy vNM-independence and Jcontinuity on sets of lotteries with equal support. The difference between the two functions must be in the way that they connect the different sets of lotteries with common support to give an overall representing function for preferences. It will 5 It must be stressed that the data in the mentioned studies are obtained for equally spaced values from the probability interval (e.g., p = i/6, i = 1, . . . , 5). A different picture could emerge if more data points near extreme probabilities were available. However, obtaining data for extreme probabilities is a difficult task as the required elicitation procedures are cognitively demanding for subjects.
6 This interpretation is analogous to the understanding under expected utility of risk aversion for money as being a deviation from expected value.
not be sufficient for NEO-EU to restrict vNM-independence and J-continuity to hold only for lotteries with common support. To clarify this, it is worth having another look at the preference foundation for EU and its stability when relaxing some preference conditions. We do this in the following section.
Expected utility
For any subset of outcomes Y ✓ X let L Y denote the set of lotteries with support Y . For example, L X is the set of lotteries that assign positive probability to each outcome in X . Obviously,
We assume throughout the paper that < is a weak order. We note that, if for each Y ✓ X the preference relation restricted to L Y satisfies J-continuity and vNM-independence, then on each set L Y we have (a restriction of) an EU-function representing the preference on that set. Additional information about preferences, which would ensure that these different EUfunctions are restrictions of the same EU representation on L, may not be available. If we relax only J-continuity to hold on each set L Y but maintain vNM-independence on L there is sufficient information to retain expected utility on L. We formally define this restricted property for <, and then we prove that we can still retain EU with the weaker continuity assumption. The preference relation < satisfies restricted J-continuity if it satisfies J-continuity restricted to the sets L Y for each outcome set Y ✓ X . That is, the following holds for each set Y ✓ X : for all
We prove in the Appendix that, in the presence of weak ordering and vNM-independence, restricted J-continuity implies Jcontinuity on L, and thus EU on L. Formally, we have the following lemma: If we weaken vNM-independence to hold only on lotteries with common support but retain J-continuity on L (and weak ordering) of the preference relation <, then EU still holds. The preference relation < satisfies restricted vNM-independence if the following holds for each set Y ✓ X : for all lotteries P, Q and R in L Y and any ↵ 2 (0, 1) we have
Note that the restricted version of vNM-independence is, on its own, not powerful enough to ensure stochastic dominance on L.
. . , n and P 6 = Q . Because, for j = 1, . . . , n, the decumulative probabilitiesp j := P n i=j p j of P, which indicate the likelihood of receiving outcome x j or better, are at least as high as the correspondingq j , and for some outcome x k , 1  k  n, we havep k >q k , P assigns more probability to better ranked outcomes, and thus it is natural for P to be strictly preferred to Q .
The unrestricted version of vNM-independence implies first order stochastic dominance. We formulate this observation as a lemma:
Jensen-continuity is weaker than (Euclidean) continuity on L, but in the presence of weak order and stochastic dominance it implies the latter (see Abdellaoui, 2002, Lemma 18 In terms of probabilities of obtaining an outcome, stochastic dominance implies that an elementary shift of probability " > 0 from a lower ranked outcome x j to an adjacent better outcome x j+1 improves a lottery (j = 0, . . . , n 1). Successive elementary shifts can be applied to show that any shift of probability " > 0 from a lower ranked to a higher ranked outcome improves a lottery, which, by repeated applications is equivalent to stochastic dominance. It has been shown that, when the lotteries are presented in a non-transparent format with multiple elementary shifts being applied, people often violate stochastic dominance (see, e.g., Birnbaum (2008) for a summary of experimental evidence). We could, therefore, have formulated stochastic dominance as a preference for lotteries resulting from improvements by an elementary shift of probability. From an empirical and behavioural point of view, this definition seems more appealing because elementary shifts in probability are transparent and people's choices agree with the preference for the lottery that is improved by an elementary shift.
There is a further implication of vNM-independence that refers to the effect on preference of common elementary shifts in probabilities. We introduce some notation before formally stating this condition, which will also prove useful when considering variations of this principle. Let P 2 L Y with Y = {y j , . . . , y m } for 0  j  m  n, and let z 2 X . For " > 0 let ( ", y i ; ", z)P be the lottery in L Y [{z} in which probability " is taken away from an outcome y i 2 Y immediately preceding outcome z in the rank and " is added to z. Formally,
Similarly, for " > 0 let (", z; ", y i )P be the lottery in L Y [{z} in which probability " is taken away from an outcome y i 2 Y immediately following outcome z in the rank and " is added to z.
Here, too, we require (", z; ", y i )P 2 L, hence, it is implicit in this notation that "  p i . The preference relation < satisfies independence of common (elementary) probability shifts on L if
property, formulated here in a transparent form that involves only elementary probability shifts, says that joint elementary shifts in probability leave the preference between two lotteries unaffected. It is similar to Machina's (1989) replacement invariance property, however, with the qualification that only replacements of an outcome by a next best outcome are allowed. The following simple example illustrates.
Suppose there are only three outcomes x 1 x 2 x 3 , and consider the preference between lotteries P, Q , as follows:
with " > 0 (min{p 2 ", q 2 "} 0). Note that both lotteries give probability " to the common outcome x 2 (the boxed probabilityoutcome pair). Independence of common probability shifts says that we can replace x 2 by x 3 without affecting the preference between the lotteries. Hence, we obtain
For general lotteries, repeated application of the independence of common probability shifts allows replacements of the common pair (", x i ) in P and Q by any pair (", x j ) with x j x i if " is small enough such that p i " 0. The next lemma formally states that vNM-independence implies the weaker independence of common probability shifts.
Lemma 4. Assume < is a weak order on L that satisfies vNMindependence. Then, < satisfies independence of common probability shifts. ⇤ We can now provide an alternative foundation for EU, which will serve as comparison to the NEO-EU foundation that is presented in Section 5. We formulate this result as a theorem:
Theorem 5. The following two statements are equivalent for a preference relation < on L:
(ii) The preference relation < is a Jensen-continuous weak order that satisfies stochastic dominance and independence of common probability shifts.
The utility function u is cardinal. ⇤ Remark 6. Theorem 5 remains valid if we replace J-continuity by restricted J-continuity. Theorem 5 also remains valid if one restricts independence of common probability shifts to hold only for lotteries with common support. ⇤
Restricting in statement (ii) of Theorem 5 both J-continuity and independence of common probability shifts to hold only for lotteries with common support implies that EU holds on each set L Y for each non-empty set of outcomes Y ✓ X . However, in general, on L EU need not hold anymore as can be inferred from the fact that NEO-EU also satisfies all those resulting properties. While those properties are necessary for NEO-EU they are not sufficient. The examples in the next section indicate that additional properties must be invoked to derive NEO-EU.
Complications for general preferences
In this section we present examples that illustrate difficulties for deriving NEO-EU when considering lotteries over general sets of outcomes. The first example shows that, while for lotteries with common support EU holds (as mentioned in Section 2 this is common to EU and NEO-EU preferences), it need not be the case that NEO-EU holds for a preference on L.
Example 7. For a lottery P let supp(P) = {y P 0 , . . . , y P k } for some 0  k  n, and assume that y P 0 · · · y P k . Define the preference relation< on L as follows:
for some (possibly different) utility functions u,ũ: X ! R that order outcomes according to the ranking x 0
The preference in the previous example cannot, in general, be represented by NEO-EU, and the example shows that simply restricting J-continuity and vNM-independence will not retain enough power from the original properties to tie down NEO-EU preferences: one loses, e.g., stochastic dominance. In addition, this example also points at two other important aspects that need to be addressed when the set of outcomes is arbitrary. First, for general preferences the existence of common cardinal utility for the representations on sets of lotteries with different support may not be given, and second, a unique pair of parameters , to measure optimism/pessimism may also not exist. Consider the following example:
Example 8. Let X = {x 0 , x 1 , x 2 } and let u be a utility function defined as u(x i ) = i/2 for i = 0, 1, 2, and take = = 1/6. Let the preference < on L be represented by
Observe that the representation
represents the same preference on L. ⇤ Example 8 illustrates an identification problem that may occur if there is no possibility to relate the sets of lotteries that have different support. In Example 8 preferences agree with an EUrepresentation on the set of lotteries A :
Accordingly, the ranking of lotteries in A is completely independent of the degrees of optimism or of pessimism. The latter matter only when comparing lotteries from A with lotteries from the sets
i.e., it is the union of five disjoint sets. This lack of connectedness means that one can, for example, increase the parameters , by any arbitrary small " > 0 (here " = 1/6) and re-scale the (cardinal) utility u appropriately (here 2u is taken) to obtain a different representation, e V , that agrees with the ranking of lotteries on L and has different parameters˜ ,˜ that govern pessimism and optimism. Note that for V the measure of optimism is /(1 ) = 1/4 while for e V the measure of optimism is˜ /(1 ˜ ˜ ) = 1.
In Example 8 preferences satisfy weak order, stochastic dominance, restricted J-continuity and independence of common probability shifts restricted to lotteries with common support (by comparison, see statement (ii) of Theorem 5 where the restrictions do not apply). The example shows that, by restricting jointly the independence of common probability shifts and J-continuity to lotteries with common support, structural richness is lost that prevents the simultaneous identification of a unique pair of parameters , together with cardinal utility. Without uniquely determined measures of optimism or pessimism any interpersonal comparison of these attitudes is impossible. To avoid this extreme situation (like in Examples 7 and 8), we make the following structural assumption for preferences.
Assumption 9. If n > 1 then, for any i 2 {1, . . . , n 1}, there exist P 2 L {x i+1 ,...,x n } and Q 2 L {x i ,...,x n } such that P ⇠ Q , and there exist R 2 L {x 0 ,...,x i 1 } and S 2 L {x 0 ,...,x i } such that R ⇠ S. ⇤ Assumption 9 excludes very extreme forms of optimism (pessimism) because it excludes preferences where a particular outcome is so attractive (unattractive), such that all lotteries without a positive probability for this best (worst) outcome are perceived inferior (superior). To model such preferences one would allow the parameters and to depend on the extreme outcomes; see Cohen (1992) for such a model where security concerns and aspects of potential are treated. Under EU, such cases are excluded because of continuity (or vNM-independence) at extreme probabilities. If the set of outcomes is sufficiently rich such that utility is continuous (as in, e.g., Chateauneuf et al. (2007) ) one can also exclude such extreme forms of optimism and pessimism. However, even with a rich set of outcomes, Assumption 9 need not hold if, for example, preferences were discontinuous. Here we do not have continuity of utility and we relax continuity at extreme probabilities, hence, we have to exclude very extreme forms of optimism and pessimism to obtain desired uniqueness results for the parameters and for utility. We, therefore, view Assumption 9 as a restriction on preferences and not as a restriction on the outcome set.
For preferences that satisfy Assumption 9 there is sufficient ''overlap'' between the images of the sets of lotteries with different support to allow for the identification of cardinal utility. This way, preferences like those in Example 7 are excluded. The principle that will be used for this purpose is a weaker variant of independence of common probability shifts. The preference < satisfies restricted independence of common (elementary) probability shifts if
whenever P, Q have common best and common worst outcomes and the lotteries ( ", x i ; ", x i+1 )P, ( ", x i ; ", x i+1 )Q have common best and common worst outcomes.
Restricted independence of common probability shifts says that the preference between two lotteries with common best and common worst outcomes remains unaffected by a joint elementary probability shift if the resulting lotteries also have (possibly different) common best and common worst outcomes.
Together with the structural assumption, restricted independence of common probability shifts excludes preferences like those of Example 8 if weak order, restricted J-continuity, stochastic dominance and restricted vNM-independence also hold. A cardinal utility must exist in this case. Yet, as the following example shows, this is still not sufficient to guarantee a unique pair of parameters , , given those properties.
Example 10. Assume that X = {x 0 , x 1 , x 2 } and let u(x i ) = i. Define the preference < through the representation
Example 10 combines two NEO-EU forms. Specifically, lotteries for which the worst outcome x 0 can obtain are evaluated by NEO-EU with = 1/6 = , while lotteries where x 0 is impossible are evaluated by NEO-EU with˜ = 0, = 1/6. This example illustrates that NEO-EU preferences must satisfy additional conditions that pin down the parameter and the parameter such that these become independent of the magnitude of the worst and best outcomes.
We conclude this section by noting that the preference in Examples 8 and 10 belong to a larger class called the security and potential level (SPL) preferences (Lopes, 1986; Cohen, 1992; Diecidue and van de Ven, 2008) , which have the general representation
with a cardinal utility u and some real-valued functions f (m P , M P ) > 0, g(m P , M P ) that depend only on the worst and best outcomes within a lottery and such that SPL respects stochastic dominance (see, e.g., the main theorem in Cohen (1992, p.116) ) Security and potential level preferences agree with NEO-EU preferences if and only if there exist unique 0  ,  1 with + < 1 such that
In the next section we propose preference conditions that ensure the latter conditions.
Preference foundation for NEO-EU
The previous section has illustrated a few complications that may occur if J-continuity and independence of common probability shifts are relaxed. A structural richness assumption for preferences was required to identify cardinal utility. We now focus on the identification of the parameters and which are uniquely determined under NEO-EU. The fact that these parameters are independent of the magnitude of the worst, respectively, best outcome is characteristic for NEO-EU. The following analysis demonstrates an implication of NEO-EU.
Suppose we have found lotteries P 2 L {x 0 ,x 1 ,x 2 } and Q 2 L {x 0 ,x 1 } such that P ⇠ Q . Suppose now that we shift a sufficiently small probability " > 0 from outcome x 1 to outcome x 2 and when we do this for both lotteries we obtain two new lotteries ordered as follows
Under weak order, restricted J-continuity, restricted independence of common probability shifts and stochastic dominance we know that EU holds on L {x 0 ,x 1 ,x 2 } . Hence for any ↵ 2 (0, 1) we have
The latter preference can also be written as
For ↵ sufficiently small we can find ✓ 0, such that an additional probability shift from x 1 now to x 2 reinstalls indifference:
Note that we use ↵ to ensure that the resulting object is a welldefined lottery in L {x 0 ,x 1 ,x 2 } . Substitution of NEO-EU in the latter indifference implies
and substitution of NEO-EU into P ⇠ Q gives 7 Note that stochastic dominance excludes a strict preference for the first lottery.
Further, EU implies indifference between the lotteries that follow.
From these two equalities we obtain ✓ =
.
Note that this relationship is independent of outcomes and probabilities. That is, if we, e.g., find P
for any sufficiently small ↵ 0 , " 0 2 (0, 1). Hence, the relative measure of optimism ✓ must be consistent within and across sets L Y .
We can now formulate this property of consistency for <. The preference relation < satisfies consistent optimism on L if for any
, and ✓ 0 with P ⇠ Q and
In a dual manner we formulate consistency for the relative measure of pessimism . The preference relation < satisfies consistent pessimism on L if for any P 2 L {x i ,...,x j } and Q 2 L {x i+1 ,...,x j 0 } , i < j 0  j, ", ↵ 2 (0, 1), and 0 with P ⇠ Q and
These two variants of consistency are very weak forms of the probability tradeoff consistency property discussed in Abdellaoui (2002) and Köbberling and Wakker (2003) . Related consistency properties appeared in Chateauneuf (1999) and Zank (2010) . To illustrate the relationship, consider the special case when X = {x 0 , x 1 , x 2 }. The tradeoff consistency property for probabilities can be formulated for probability tradeoffs associated with outcomes x 1 and x 2 , as follows, where we assume that all lotteries are welldefined following elementary shifts of probability. Suppose that we observe an indifference
Take an elementary shift of probability " from x 0 to x 1 in the left lottery, which needs to be compensated by an elementary shift of probability ⇢ from x 0 to x 1 in order to maintain the indifference between the lotteries. We then say that a tradeoff µ for and a tradeoff µ+" for +⇢ are observed from the previous indifference, respectively from the subsequent indifference following the ''compensated'' elementary shifts in probabilities:
Suppose now that we observe the indifference
Then, probability tradeoff consistency requires that
that is, following the same compensated elementary probability shifts, now from outcome x 1 to outcome x 2 , equivalent probability tradeoffs µ+" for +⇢ must be obtained. In general, the property is required for elementary shifts among any outcome pairs. The fact that the derived tradeoffs µ for and µ + " for + ⇢ are independent of the outcomes where they were initially observed, suggests that is possible to separate utility for outcomes from probability attitudes. Indeed, as Köbberling and Wakker (2003) have demonstrated, such separation is implied in the presence of other standard preference conditions. To see that our consistent optimism (pessimism) condition is much weaker than the probability tradeoff condition, note that we require consistent probability tradeoffs only for the possibly different best (worst) outcomes; no intermediate compensated elementary probability shifts are invoked. The resulting conditions are necessary for NEO-EU and, in the presence of the preference conditions discussed in the previous section, they are also sufficient. This is our main result and is presented next. The function u is cardinal, and the parameters and are uniquely determined (whenever there are more than 2 strictly ordered outcomes). ⇤ Note that Theorem 11 supplements the preference foundation for NEO-EU with a tool for measuring the indices of relative optimism ✓ and relative pessimism directly from preferences.
This makes the result appealing for empirical and experimental analyses. Current methods for deriving these indices have invoked an intermediate step of eliciting decision weights for probabilities and subsequently carried out parametric fitting to obtain jointly both parameters , from which ✓ and can be determined (e.g., Abdellaoui (2000) , Abdellaoui et al. (2005) , Abdellaoui et al. (2010) ). The discussion at the beginning of this section indicates how one can, by invoking only three outcomes under NEO-EU, elicit four indifferences to directly determine ✓ and . From a first indifference between lotteries P 2 L {x 0 ,x 1 ,x 2 } and Q 2 L {x 1 ,x 2 } one performs an elementary probability shift of small probability mass " from outcome x 1 to outcome x 2 , thereby perturbing Q . Subsequently, one infers ✓ by shifting probability mass from x 1 to x 2 in lottery P until indifference between the resulting lottery and the perturbed Q is obtained. A similar procedure, involving two indifference elicitations can be used to derive directly. This method can, in fact, also be used to find out whether the parameters ✓, are independent of the outcomes chosen (x 0 , x 1 , x 2 ) and whether they are independent of the probabilities for best (worst) outcomes, and thus, Theorem 11 also provides a method to falsify NEO-EU. The proof of Theorem 11 is presented in the Appendix.
Conclusion
Our main objective in this paper has been to provide a preference foundation for NEO-EU if the set of outcomes is very general. We have shown that, under some structural richness of preferences, a foundation of NEO-EU preferences is obtained by relaxing J-continuity and by adjustments of the vNM-independence principle in specific ways. We need to maintain stochastic dominance and relax only the implication of vNM-independence that concerns common probability shifts. The latter are permitted as long as probability is shifted to common outcomes that either were possible in the original pair of lotteries or were impossible. Further, shifts of probabilities are also permitted for best (worst) outcomes but only after appropriate adjustment for optimism (pessimism). Our main theorem shows that the latter implication is the critical difference between EU and NEO-EU. Moreover it demonstrates that NEO-EU has a very rigid means of accommodating optimism and pessimism. The corresponding consistency properties reveal that optimism and pessimism under NEO-EU are completely independent of the magnitude of best or worst outcomes, respectively, but also that optimism and pessimism are independent of the probability of best or worst outcomes. This suggests that the interpretation of the popular NEO-EU model as expected utility with consistent (and constant) optimism and consistent (and constant) pessimism is appropriate.
Appendix. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Obviously J-continuity on L implies restricted J-continuity. We now prove the reversed implication. There is not much to show if X contains a singleton. For the case that X = {x 0 , x 1 } we have to prove that J-continuity holds on L, i.e., to demonstrate that for any P
By definition, any S 2 L is a mixture of x 0 with x 1 for a unique
follows that ↵ P > ↵ Q . This follows from vNM-independence and reflexivity of <. Two cases have to be considered: R Q and R 4 Q . If R Q , then ↵ R > ↵ Q and, thus, for any convex combination
↵ 2 (0, 1). Now, take any sufficiently small µ 2 (0, 1) such that ↵ P > µ↵ R + (1 µ)↵ Q . Then P µR + (1 µ)Q follows. If R 4 Q , then vNM-independence implies Q < ↵R + (1 ↵)Q for all ↵ 2 (0, 1) and together with P Q and transitivity of < we obtain P µR + (1 µ)Q for any µ 2 (0, 1). Also, because
Together the previous two cases imply that J-continuity holds on L if X contains exactly two outcomes.
If X contains more than two outcomes then X also contains a best outcome, x n , and a worst outcome, x 0 . Hence, x 0 S x n holds for any S 2 L different from x 0 or x n . This follows from vNM-independence. Thus, weak ordering and vNM-independence together with J-continuity on L {x 0 ,x n } imply that any S 2 L different from x 0 or x n is indifferent to a mixture of x 0 with x n for some ↵ S 2 (0, 1). Obviously, by setting ↵ x n = 1 and ↵ x 0 = 0, it follows that for any S 2 L there exists a unique
that J-continuity on L holds follows from analogous arguments as in the case that X contains two outcomes. This concludes the proof of Lemma 1. ⇤ Proof of Lemma 2. Assume that < satisfies vNM-independence and that for some P, Q 2 L we havep j q j for all j = 1, . . . , n and P 6 = Q . Suppose that lottery Q equals P except thatq i <p i for some i 2 {1, . . . , n}. Hence, P is obtained from Q by an elementary shift of probability p i q i (or equivalentlyp i q i ) from outcome x i 1 to outcome x i . We prove that P Q . The following equivalences follow from repeatedly applying vNM-independence. Define
A subsequent application of vNM-independence by mixing both lotteries in the previous preference with
by giving probability weight (1 p i ) to S, gives P Q (using
Suppose now that we have shown that P 0 Q 0 whenever p 0 j q 0 j for all j = 1, . . . , n and P 0 6 = Q 0 if the set I := {j:p 0 j >q 0 j } is of cardinality |I| < k for some k > 1. We proceed by induction on |I| and show that this statement must be true also for |I| = k. Assume that for P, Q 2 L we havep j q j for all j = 1, . . . , n, P 6 = Q , and |I| = k. We prove that P Q . Let i be the smallest index such thatp i >q i (that is, for j < i we havep j =q j ). Let now R, S be lotteries defined as follows
By the induction assumption it follows that R S becausep j /q i q j /q i for all j > i, R 6 = S and |{j:p j /q i >q j /q i }| = k 1. By vNM-independence the following equivalences hold
A further application of vNM-independence by mixing the latter lotteries with
thereby giving probability weight (1 p i ) to the latter lottery, gives P Q . Recall that P and Q were arbitrary withp j q j for all j = 1, . . . , n, P 6 = Q , and |I| = |{j:p j >q j }| = k. Therefore, by induction, it follows that P Q wheneverp j q j for all j = 1, . . . , n, P 6 = Q . Hence, first order stochastic dominance is derived from vNM-independence, which concludes the proof. ⇤ Proof of Lemma 3. That statement (i) implies statement (ii) is immediate. The reversed implication follows from the observation that on L X the properties in statement (ii) imply that EU holds on L X . Further, as observed in Lemma 18 of Abdellaoui (2002) , weak order, stochastic dominance and J-continuity imply the stronger Euclidean continuity on L. Therefore, there exists a unique continuous extension of the (previously established) EU-representation on L X to L that represents preferences on L. This implies statement (ii). Uniqueness results for utility are carried over from EU on L X to its extension on L, thus u is cardinal. This completes the proof of Lemma 3. ⇤ Proof of Lemma 4. Assume that < satisfies vNM-independence.
Take any P, Q 2 L such that P < Q and such that p i , q i > 0. Suppose, to the contrary, that there exists " > 0 such that for the two lotteries ( ", x i ; ", x i+1 )P and ( ", x i ; ", x i+1 )Q the following preference holds
Then vNM-independence says that
and further that
which contradicts reflexivity. This shows that P < Q ) ( ",
The reversed implication is derived in a similar way. Hence, for all (admissible) " > 0 it follows that P < Q , ( ", immediate. Next we derive the reversed implication and we concentrate on the case that n > 1 (the other cases are immediate). We write lotteries as decumulative distributions (see also Abdellaoui (2002 ), Zank (2010 , Diecidue et al. (2009) , who use similar notation). So, instead of P := (p 0 , x 0 ; . . . ; p i , x i ; p i+1 , x i+1 ; . . . ; p n , x n ) we write P = (p 1 , . . . ,p n ) withp i = P n j=i p j for i = 1, . . . , n (for simplicity we drop the outcomes from the notation as well asp 0 which is always equal to 1). Then J-continuity, and weak order are defined similarly for decumulative distributions, while stochastic dominance and independence of common probability shifts are translated as monotonicity with respect to decumulative probabilities and additivity, respectively. Formally, monotonicity says that P < Q wheneverp i q i for all i = 1, . . . , n with P Q if at least one of the inequalities is strict. Additivity says that for all j = 1, . . . , n and 1 > " > 0
An important implication of additivity is (comonotonic) independence of common decumulative probabilities or, simply, independence:
(p 1 , . . . ,p j 1 ,r j ,p j+1 . . . ,p n ) < (q 1 , . . . ,q j 1 ,r j ,q j+1 , . . . ,q n ) , (p 1 , . . . ,p j 1 ,ŝ j ,p j+1 . . . ,p n ) < (q 1 , . . . ,q j 1 ,ŝ j ,q j+1 , . . . ,q n ),
Independence follows from applying additivity twice, first with " = |r j ŝ j | at the jth decumulative probability and then at the (j + 1)th decumulative probability with ".
We know from Abdellaoui (2002) that weak order, J-continuity and monotonicity imply Euclidean continuity and thus, by Debreu (1954) , the existence of a representing function V : L ! R. We use the results of Wakker (1993) to show that by adding (comonotonic) independence the representing function V is additively separable as follows:
with continuous strictly monotonic functions V 1 , . . . , V n : (0, 1) ! R which are bounded except maybe V 1 and V n which could be unbounded when approaching extreme probabilities (i.e., at 1, or at 0, respectively). Further, additivity implies that the functions V j are linear, and hence, proportional to their sum. The V j 's can then be extended continuously to 0 and 1 (this follows from Wakker (1993, Proposition 3.5) ). Hence, by requiring V j (0) = 0 for all j = 1, . . . , n we can conclude that there exist positive numbers a j such that
We define utility iteratively as u(x 0 ) = 0 and u( If we restrict independence of common probability shifts to lotteries with common support, the proof of Theorem 5 remains valid if we restrict < to L X . Euclidean continuity, which holds on L as a result of J-continuity and stochastic dominance, implies that EU on L X can be extended uniquely to EU on L. Statement (i) of Theorem 5 then follows.
This concludes the proof of Remark 6. ⇤ Proof of Theorem 11. First we assume statement (i) and derive statement (ii). We briefly present the arguments: That < is a weak order follows immediately from NEO-EU. Restricted J-continuity follows from observing that NEO-EU and EU agree on lotteries with common support. Stochastic dominance follows because utility respects the strict ordering of outcomes under NEO-EU. NEO-EU also agrees with EU if lotteries have common best and common worst outcomes, hence, independence restricted to lotteries with common best and common worst outcomes is satisfied. It has been indicated in the main text that NEO-EU satisfies consistent optimism. Similarly, consistent pessimism follows from NEO-EU. Hence, statement (ii) holds. Next, we assume statement (ii) and derive statement (i). If X contains a single outcome the proof is trivial. For two strictly ranked outcomes weak order and stochastic dominance already ensure that we have a representation of preferences solely based on the probability of obtaining the best outcome. This representation is continuous. Any monotone transformation of this representation (e.g., one which is continuous and linear for probabilities in (0,1) leading to NEO-EU, i.e., to statement (i)) is also representing the preference relation. It is well known that in this case uniqueness results are obviously different.
We assume throughout the rest of the proof that X contains at least three strictly ordered outcomes. We note that on
, the set of lotteries with m P = x 0 and M P = x n , EU holds with utility function u. This follows from observing that the properties in statement (ii) of Theorem 11 imply statement
by stochastic dominance and restricted independence of common probability shifts the same EU function also represents < on any subset of lotteries L Y for Y $ X .
We proceed with the proof by induction on |X|, the cardinality of X .
First we derive NEO-EU for X = {x 0 , x 1 , x 2 }. We extend the representing function EU on L X to a NEO-EU representation for < on L. We define utility as u i := u(x i ), i = 0, 1, 2.
Case 1: By Assumption 9 there exists P 2 L X and Q 2 L {x 1 ,x 2 } such that P ⇠ Q . It follows that EU(P) EU(Q ) by stochastic dominance. Hence there exists a uniquely determined non-negative
From P ⇠ Q and EU (P) EU(Q ) we know that for any sufficiently small " > 0 we have
As EU holds on L X and (", x 0 ; ", x 1 )P, (",
By restricted J-continuity on L X and stochastic dominance there exists a unique 0 such that
for ↵ sufficiently small, such that the resulting object is a lottery in L X . Substitution of EU into the latter indifference reveals that ⇢ = . Further, by consistent pessimism,
with cardinal utility and uniquely determined , represents the preference relation <. 
As EU holds on L X and ( ", x 1 ; ", x 2 )P, ( ",
By restricted J-continuity on L X and stochastic dominance there ex-
for ↵ sufficiently small, such that the resulting object is a lottery in L X . Substitution of EU into the latter indifference reveals that = ✓. Further, by consistent optimism,
Similarly to Case 1, the analysis in Case 2 demonstrates that on
with cardinal utility and uniquely determined ✓ , represents the preference relation <.
Note thatṼ (P) + ✓ u(M P ) is also representing the preference < on L X [ L {x 0 ,x 2 } [ L {x 1 ,x 2 } (because M P = x 2 ) and, further, u(m P ) + V (P) is also representing the preference < on L X [ L {x 0 ,x 2 } [ L {x 0 ,x 1 } (because m P = x 0 ). We therefore conclude that Similarly to Case 1 above, we can find sufficiently small ", ↵ 2 (0, 1) and obtain [↵(" + ), x 0 ; ↵(" + ),
By consistent pessimism, the latter two indifferences, together with S ⇠ x 1 , imply that It is worth noting that, to derive the latter equation, we could have exploited P 0 ⇠ Q 0 , the analysis in Case 2, and then apply consistent optimism and substitute V . We conclude that V represents preference on L.
To complete the proof for the case that X = {x 0 , x 1 , x 2 }, we define , 2 [0, 1) with + < 1 through Thus, by the induction assumption and the uniqueness results for NEO-representations, it follows that X 0 and X 0 are independent of X 0 . Hence, we can drop the subscripts and use and henceforth. are uniquely determined, and that NEO is indeed representing the preference < on L. Hence, by induction, it follows that for any set X consisting of finitely many strictly ranked outcomes the preference < on L is represented by NEO. This proves statement (i).
Uniqueness results for utility and the parameters , apply by construction. This completes the proof of Theorem 11. ⇤
